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ABSTRACT 
 
The study addresses two separate but related issues in connection with peoples’ real life 
moral decisions and judgements. First, the notion of moral orientation is examined in terms of  
its consistency across varying contexts, its relation to gender and to gender role. Second, a 
new aspect of moral reasoning is explored – the influence on moral decision-making of 
considering the consequences of an action.  Fifty-eight undergraduate students were asked to 
discuss two personal and two impersonal real life moral dilemmas. The results reveal a 
significant interaction between gender role and type of dilemma. However, moral orientation 
was not consistent across various dilemmas and gender was not related to any particular 
orientation. Also the results indicate a significant difference between the reasoning of 
consequences of personal-antisocial conflicts and impersonal-antisocial conflicts. These 
findings suggest that different moral orientations may be embedded in life experience and 
connect with an individual’s sense of his or her moral identity in real-life situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Whilst much work on moral reasoning has sought to identify the relatively abstract 
conceptual structures which underpin moral judgements, relatively little has sought to 
examine the ways in which moral judgements and decisions are made in real life.  There are, 
however, good reasons for examining the ways in which these more “everyday” judgements 
are made.   Not only is it important to learn something more of the social and cultural context 
in which moral thought is embedded.  It is also crucial to explore moral decision-making in 
real life to understand better the links between more hypothetical moral reasoning and moral 
action. 
This paper presents research that seeks to identify factors that influence the decisions 
that individuals make in response to real life moral dilemmas. Its empirical focus will form 
two, inter-related strands. An initial strand considers how social contextual factors 
(internalised notions of gender role and more externalised notions of gender) relate to moral 
orientation.  A second strand explores how different types of dilemmas may entail different 
consequences for individuals that, in turn, relate to the sorts of justifications and explanations 
they give for particular courses of action. 
 
Moral decision-making in real life 
A famous example of the difference between hypothetical reasoning and justification of 
experienced behaviour is given by Milgram’s (1963) study of obedience. When participants 
are faced with a hypothetical dilemma of either harming an innocent stranger or disobeying an 
authority figure they frequently choose the latter. However, the study showed that whilst more 
than sixty five percent of those who were faced with the dilemma in reality chose to harm an 
innocent stranger, few felt such behaviour would be morally acceptable when asked about an 
imaginery scenario. Moreover when Milgram’s adult participants were asked about their 
actions they justified their behaviour with reasons equivilant to stage one on Kohlberg’s 
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(1969, 1984) model – for example, the status of the experimenter.  It would seem unilkely that 
all of Milgram’s particpiants were stage one reasoners. Rather, something about the 
experimental situation and their perceived roles within it influenced their moral decisions, 
judgements and ultimately their behaviour. 
Dominant models of moral development (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969) have focused theoretical 
attention on age-related shifts in moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s methodology involved 
presenting individuals with various hypothetical moral dilemmas which were either discussed 
with the participants by means of an interview or reflected upon using a questionnaire. 
Responses are then scored according to a specific manual devised by Kohlberg and his 
colleagues. Yet although the value and influence of this work on moral development is clear, 
a consistent criticism of, for instance, Kohlberg’s theory has been that he failed adequately to 
consider what we might term “real life” moral decision-making (Krebs, Denton & Wark, 
1997; Leman, 2001). Research on real life dilemmas (Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale 
& Bush, 1991; Carpendale & Krebs 1995; Wark & Krebs 1996, 1997) found that once 
participants are asked to judge moral conflicts that they have experienced in their life, moral 
stage tends to be lower, and stage consistency of judgements diminishes across different types 
of moral dilemmas. A further point of criticism highlighted the difference between moral 
judgement competency and moral judgement in practice. 
Studies that compare moral behaviour (action) and moral reasoning have highlighted 
the problem of how stages of reasoning (derived from hypothetical problems) are related to 
real life moral behaviour. Denton and Krebs (1990) found that despite people’s 
acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of impaired driving they still drove home while having 
high blood alcohol level; Carpendale and Krebs (1995) showed that a monetary incentive also 
affected moral choices. And Walker (1984) has claimed that Kohlberg’s stage theory has a 
self-limiting scope in that it does not deal directly with the issues of moral emotions and 
behaviour – rather, it deals with the adequacy of justifications for solutions to moral conflicts. 
Wark and Krebs (1996) summarise a position common to many in arguing that whilst there 
Moral decision-making in real life  /  3 
 
are numerous studies on moral judgement only a few have investigated the important and 
socially pertinent question of how people make moral decisions in their everyday lives. 
  
Gender and moral orientation 
Another critic of Kohlberg’s emphasis on abstract aspects of moral thought was Carol 
Gilligan. Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg’s theory is insensitive to the way females view 
morality and that there are sex related (but not sex-specific) differences in an individual’s 
orientation to life. These differences become particularly visible in terms of moral reasoning. 
On one hand, men have a justice orientation which involves an emphasis on autonomy, 
separateness and noninterference with abstract rights. On the other women hold a care 
orientation involving more emphasis on a concern for the well being of others and a view of 
the self as connected and interdependent with others in concrete situations (Walker, de Vries 
& Trevethan, 1987). 
Gilligan’s evaluation of responses to real life dilemmas by men and women revealed 
that although the majority of people used both care and justice orientations, the majority of 
women (75%) used a predominantly care orientation whereas the majority of men (79%) used 
a predominantly justice orientation. Also, 36% of women did not involve any consideration of 
justice in their report and 36% of men did not present any consideration of care. These 
findings led Gilligan to conclude that individuals use one predominanting orientation related 
to their gender when discussing real life moral conflicts.  
Gilligan claimed that males gain higher moral maturity scores on Kohlberg’s test 
because they tend to make justice oriented judgments which are captured at higher stages (4-
5). Females, on the other hand, tend to make care oriented judgments which are captured at a 
lower stage (3). Although some studies supported this assumption (e.g. Bussey & Maughan, 
1982) a large number of studies refuted the claim for significant sex differences in moral 
maturity (see Walker, 1984 for a review of the literature). Moreover, research on moral 
orientation revealed that studies that found that women use higher percentage of care oriented 
terms in real life dilemmas than men were methodologically flawed by not controlling for 
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type of dilemma (e.g. Ford & Lowery 1986; Walker et al. 1987; Gilligan & Attanucci 1988; 
Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson 1988; Wark & Krebs 1996). 
 
Moral reasoning: considering the consequences of action 
Following many studies that compared Kohlberg’s philosophical dilemmas with real 
life dilemmas, Krebs and his colleagues have argued that the highest stages of moral 
reasoning rarely exist outside the Western academic context (within which Kohlberg’s 
philosophical dilemmas were typically tested). In attempting to explore factors that may 
explain the variance between judgments (measured by stages in Kohlberg’s model) of 
philosophical dilemmas and judgments of real life dilemmas they found an interaction 
between moral judgment competency and various performance factors (detailed in Krebs et 
al., 1997). Individuals’ ability to retain lower stages of moral judgment and use them in 
response to real life dilemmas does not follow Kohlberg’s theoretical assumption regarding 
stage replacement, but is more in line with other models of moral judgment such as Rest’s 
“layer-cake” model and Levine’s “additive – inclusive” model. Both these models suggest 
that new stages are built on old stages, which are retained and may be used in various 
circumstances. 
Despite this important outcome of recent research, the remaining question is why there 
is such descrepency between judgment of philosophical dilemmas and judgment of real life 
dilemmas. Krebs et al. (1997) attempted to explain some aspects in real life decision making, 
which may serve future research in clarifying how people make moral decisions in their 
everyday lives. Two elements are central to the position. One is the distinction between a 
third person perspective (which is implied in philosophical dilemmas) and a first person 
perspective (which is implied in personal, real life dilemmas). When people come across 
moral conflicts in their life the question they are faced with is: “ what should I do?” which is 
different to “what should one do?”. Reasoning in real life situations involves decisions, which 
are much more practical, self serving, and less rational than reasoning of hypothetical 
characters. The second aspect relates to the first in suggesting that factors that people consider 
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when they make decisions in real life are influenced by functional concerns such as advancing 
self-interest or social harmony, and by motivational and affective processes. 
One of the most important pragmatic concerns is the consequences of moral decisions. 
Krebs et al. (1997) provide a detailed account of the various types of consequences people 
consider, which will not be repeated here. However, their explanation of the distinction 
between consequences to others and consequences to the self is a central focus of this study. 
Although people believe hypothetical characters should act in a certain way and although they 
provide reasoning to support that belief, they themselves would have not made that decision 
in real life due to the consequences of their decision. For example, despite people’s belief that 
Heinz should steal the drug (cf. Kohlberg, 1984, p.640), they themselves would not steal it as 
they would not be willing to suffer the consequences (Krebs, Vermeulen, Denton & 
Carpendale, 1994). It seems possible that an inconsistency between what one should and 
would do in these situations leads to a dissonance that can be partly resolved by changing 
one’s mind about a particular course of action (Krebs et al. 1997). Krebs et al. (1997) not only 
provide a potential explanation for the inconsistency between reasoning of hypothetical 
dilemmas and reasoning of real life moral conflicts. They also point to a direction for future 
research into the underlying mechanisms involved in moral judgment, decision, and action.  
 
The present study 
The present study had two main aims. First it revisits Gilligan’s distinction between 
justice and care moral orientations to examine the links between moral orientation, gender , 
gender role and the type of dilemma under consideration. Despite the ample research that 
examined moral orientation, the control for type of real life dilemmas was only recently been 
carried out as part of the design rather than a post-hoc analysis. This was done by Wark and 
Krebs (1997) who did not find significant sex differences on moral orientation scores. Rather, 
they found variations in orientations, which were determined by the type of the dilemmas 
(Kohlberg’s dilemmas pulled for justice orintation, real life prosocial dilemmas pulled for 
care orientation, & real life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice orientation). The present 
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study did not include Kohlberg’s dilemmas but attempted to replicate Wark and Krebs’s 
(1997) finding regarding prosocial and antisocial (personal) dilemmas and extend further to 
examine impersonal real life dilemmas. The aim of the first part of the study was to explore 
whether Gilligan’s model is valid - whether people truly hold a dominant orientation that is 
related to their gender. If Gilligan’s model is valid then the predictions are: (a) to find moral 
orientation to be consistent across varying contexts, (b) men should make more justice 
oriented judgments than women, and (c) women should make more care oriented judgments 
than men. However, if Gilligan’s model of moral orientation is not valid then one would 
expect to find moral orientation to differ across the various dilemmas (as found by Wark & 
Krebs, 1997; Krebs et al. 1994). 
The present study also included gender role as a factor. Sochting, Skoe, and Marcia 
(1994) found that gender role was a better predictor for the type of orientation one holds. Ford 
and Lowery (1986) found that males high on femininity reported higher care ratings than 
males low on femininity. Given the large number of studies that found no strict relation 
between orientation and gender, a measure for gender role was included to determine whether 
gender role will be more predictive of moral orientation than gender.  
A second aim of the study involved using an exploratory method to study the aspects 
involved in consideration of consequences. Since this second part was exploratory no specific 
hypothesis was proposed, but a tentative prediction was that consequences to the self would 
differ from consequences to others in their effect on people’s decision-making.         
 
METHOD 
Design  
The study consisted of two parts. The first related to moral orientation and the second 
to one aspect of moral reasoning: consideration of consequences. A mixed design was 
employed in the moral orientation part. The three independent variables (IVs) were: gender 
(between participants), gender role (between participants), and type of dilemma (within 
participants). The dependent variable (DV) was moral orientation score (on a 5-point Likert 
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scale) which corresponded to the percentage of judgements that were predominantly care-
based. 
A within participants design was employed for the second moral reasoning part. The IV 
was type of dilemma, and the DV was moral reasoning scores (judged by an independent rater 
on a 5-point Likert scale) which represented the degree of influence that participants felt that 
considering consequences had on their judgement. For more details on scoring procedures, 
see “Scoring” section below. 
Participants were allocated to the various experimental conditions based on their gender 
and their gender role (as measured by the Personal Attributes Questionnaire–PAQ: Spence & 
Helmreich, 1978). Any other allocations were randomly based. 
 
Participants 
58 undergraduate students (30 females & 28 males) volunteered for the study. The 
average age of males (23 years 7 months) did not differ significantly from the average age of 
females (21 years 8 months). There were also no significant differences in age between the 
gender role groups.  
Socio-economic status (SES) ratings ranging on a scale from one to five were taken on 
the basis of parents’ occupation. The mean SES (2.17) did not differ significantly between 
men and women. Again, the mean SES for gender role groups were not statistically different.  
The average number of years in formal education (14 years) was also not significantly 
different between the two gender or gender role groups.  
Participants were asked to report whether they have children or not (parental status). 
Parental status seems to be an important factor to control following a study by Pratt et al. 
(1988) who found that mothers were significantly less justice-oriented than fathers, whereas 
the men and women without children were not significantly different. There was no 
significant difference between males and females, and between the gender role groups on 
parental status (only 4 females and 1 male were parents).  
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Participants were blind to the aims of the experiment until they returned their 
questionnaires. 
 
Materials  
Measure of Demographic Information. Participants were given a form to complete the 
following details: age, sex, number of years in formal education, work status (whether they 
work & name of occupation), parental status, and parents’ occupations. 
Gender Role. The Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ: Spence & Helmreich, 
1978) was used to distinguish between four gender role types (masculine, feminine, 
androgynous, & undifferentiated). The PAQ contains 24 items (adjectives) with a 5-point 
Likert scale. All the items refer to socially desirable traits equally divided into three scales 
(masculine, feminine, & masculine-feminine). It has been tested for reliability and internal 
consistency and rated as highly satisfactory in terms of content, construct, discriminant, and 
predictive validity. The PAQ has also been judged as conceptually equivalent to Gilligan’s 
self-concept measure (Pratt et al. 1988). 
Real Life Moral Dilemmas. Dilemma type has proved to be a very important and 
central factor in the study of moral orientation and in research on moral reasoning. Not only 
does dilemma content seem to affect the overall score of care based judgments, the 
methodology by which dilemmas were chosen and their relation to the participants’ real life 
has brought into question the usefulness of the models prevailing in the field (Walker et al. 
1987). Although some studies used real-life dilemmas the conflicts in the dilemmas were 
raised by the researchers. In more recent research using a self-report method the issues were 
raised by the participants themselves. Wark and Krebs (1996) and Krebs et al. (1991) 
compared stages of moral judgment between hypothetical dilemmas and real life ones and 
found that real life dilemmas led to significantly lower reasoning than that on the hypothetical 
dilemmas.  
Consequently, the self-report method was employed in the present study. Participants 
were asked to describe four real life moral dilemmas followed by probing questions. A 
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distinction was made between impersonal dilemmas and personal dilemmas. The term 
impersonal was defined as “moral conflicts which did not involve you or somebody close to 
you directly and that did not necessarily forced you to make a certain decision (to act in a 
specific way), but that you consider important and significant.” Whereas the term personal 
referred to “moral conflicts which directly involved you and as a result made you take some 
sort of action.” Participants were also asked to distinguish between two types of personal 
conflicts: antisocial and prosocial. This distinction was taken from Wark and Krebs (1997)1 
and was used in order to maintain consistency across dilemmas contents. The present study 
used the term antisocial to refer to dilemmas involving “reacting to a transgression (for 
example, involving violations of rules, laws or fairness) committed by them; dealing with the 
temptation to meet their own needs or desires, acquire resources, or advance their own gain 
by violating rules or laws, behaving dishonestly, immorally, or unfairly.” (Wark & Krebs, 
1997, p.166). The term prosocial was used to refer to dilemmas involving “dealing with two 
or more people making inconsistent demands on them, with implications for their relationship 
with each person; deciding whether or not to take responsibility for helping someone 
important to them.” (Wark & Krebs, 1997 p.166). These specific dilemma types were selected 
by Wark and Krebs (1997) as they were reported most frequently by participants in the Wark 
and Krebs (1996) study. Altogether participants were asked to describe two impersonal 
dilemmas, one personal antisocial, and one personal prosocial.  
Probe Questions. Following the description of each dilemma participants were asked to 
answer probing questions. Some of the questions were also based on previous research (Wark 
& Krebs, 1997, 2000; Krebs, Denton & Wark, 1997) and included questions such as “what 
                                                 
1 Although Wark and Krebs (1997) used four categories (antisocial: transgression, temptation, 
prosocial: helping, loyalty) to define prosocial and antisocial dilemmas, only a broad 
distinction was made between the two types in this study (in order to provide participants with 
less restricted definitions). Also, it seems a sensible distinction as only one dilemma of each 
kind was required, whereas Wark and Krebs (1997) asked for two dilemmas of each type. 
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did you see to be the issues involved at the time?”, “what made it a moral conflict?”, 
“why/why not?”, “what options did you or the person involved in the dilemma consider and 
why?”, “do you think you (or the person involved in the dilemma) did the right thing?” 
“why/why not?”, “under what circumstances would you have acted differently and why?” The 
form contained 22 questions. Participants were asked to describe the dilemma first (in a short 
paragraph) and then answer the questions on ensuing pages (appendix 1 contains a list of 
probe questions). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were given a package of questionnaires containing: (a) a request for 
demographic information, (b) the PAQ, (c) a request to describe four moral dilemmas 
followed by probing questions. Participants were asked to complete all questionnaires and 
return them by a certain date. On returning the questionnaires participants were thanked by 
the experimenter and were given an outline of the study.           
 
Scoring 
 (1) Gender Role. The PAQ was scored as outlined by Spence and Helmreich (1978).  
The median scores for the masculine, feminine, and masculine-feminine scales were: 20, 25, 
and 18 respectively. Based on these scores participants were categorised as follows: 18 
participants (5 females & 13 males) were classified as masculine, 14 participants (9 females 
& 5 males) were classified as feminine, 13 participants (8 females & 5 males) were classified 
as androgynous, and 13 participants (8 females & 5 males) were classified as undifferentiated. 
 (2) Moral Orientation. Lyons (1983) provides a scheme for coding considerations of 
response (Care) and considerations of rights (Justice). Some considerations of Care were 
described as concern with relationships, caring, and the promotion of the welfare of others or 
prevention of their harm. Whereas some considerations of Justice were described as 
conflicting claims between self and others, and the maintenance of rules, principles, and 
standards especially those of fairness and reciprocity. Based on the relative number of care 
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and justice considerations made to each dilemma, Lyons (1983) classified moral orientation 
as either care-based or justice-based. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) used a refined version of 
Lyon’s (1983) scheme in which they classified moral orientation as “care only”, “care focus”, 
“care justice”, “justice focus”, and “justice only”. Krebs et al. (1994) used these distinctions 
to score judgements on the following 5-point scale: “care only” (C) = 100, “care focus” (C(J)) 
= 75, “care justice” (C/J) = 50, “justice focus” (J(C)) = 25, and “justice only” (J) = 0. 
These distinctions and the 5-point scale were employed in this study. Moral orientation 
scores were calculated based on the average of all scored judgements on each dilemma. The 
average number of scorable judgements in was 12. The scoring procedure was conducted 
blind to all other information about each participant. Thirty percent of each type of dilemma 
was scored by a second scorer who was blind to the aim of the study and all other information 
about the participants. Inter-rater reliability using the Pearson’s correlation test was 86% 
agreement for the impersonal dilemmas (r(16) = 0.857, p< 0.001), 96% agreement for the 
prosocial dilemmas (r(16) = 0.927, p< 0.001), and 89% agreement for the antisocial dilemmas 
(r(16) = 0.887, p< 0.001). An average score between the two impersonal dilemmas was 
calculated for each participant before it was used in the statistical analysis.         
Consistency of moral orientation was determined following a procedure outlined in 
Walker et al. (1987). Similar to Wark and Krebs (1997) consistency of moral orientation was 
assessed in terms of the same or an adjacent score on a 5-point scale (i.e. J, J(C), J/C, C(J), C).   
 (3) Moral Reasoning – consideration of consequences.  A similar but different 
procedure to the scoring of moral orientation was used to score the percentage of 
consideration of consequences in each dilemma, which resembled the weight these 
considerations had on the evaluation of one’s behaviour. Using a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from “consequences did not lead to judgement (of what to do/how to act)” = 0 to 
“consequences very much led to judgement (of what to do/how to act)” = 1, all dilemmas 
were scored blindly to all other information about each participant. Moral reasoning scores 
were calculated based on the scored judgements on each dilemma relative to the overall 
number of scorable judgements (the highest number of documented judgements), which was 5 
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for the impersonal dilemmas and 7 for the personal dilemmas. Thirty per cent of each type of 
dilemma was scored by a second scorer who was blind to the aim of the experiment and to all 
other information about the participants. The Pearson’s correlation test was used to measure 
inter-rater reliability. The test revealed 94% agreement for the impersonal dilemmas, r (16) = 
0.937, p<0.001 and 91% agreement for the personal dilemmas, r (16) = 0.908, p<0.001.  
 
RESULTS 
 
The scores of both moral orientation and moral reasoning were recorded on a scale 
ranging from 0% to 100%.  
 
Moral Orientation 
Means scores for participants’ moral orientation are shown in Table 1. Figure 1 shows 
the total means for orientation scores across factors. Higher scores represent higher levels of 
care orientation. 
 
--Insert Table 1 about here-- 
--Insert Figure 1 about here-- 
 
As indicated in Table 1, all types of dilemma induced both care-based and justice-based 
moral judgements. However, each type pulled with different strength for each orientation. The 
prosocial dilemmas had a strong tendency towards the care-based orientation, whereas the 
antisocial dilemmas showed strong tendency towards the justice-based orientation (the 
impersonal dilemmas appeared to situate around the centre between the two personal 
dilemmas). The direction of these results (regarding the prosocial & antisocial dilemmas) is 
similar to the findings obtained by Wark and Krebs (1997). However, unlike Wark and Krebs 
(1997), the prosocial dilemmas tended towards the care orientation more than the antisocial 
tended towards the justice orientation.  
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A 4 (gender role) X 2 (gender) X 3 (dilemma type) mixed design Anova, with repeated 
measures on the last factor was conducted to evaluate the effects of the factors: gender role 
(masculine, feminine, androgynous, & undifferentiated), gender (males & females), and 
dilemma type (impersonal, antisocial, & prosocial) on moral orientation scores. The test 
produced a significant main effect for dilemma type F (2, 100) = 29.96, p<0.001, qualified by 
a dilemma type and gender role interaction F (6, 100) = 2.78, p<0.05. There was no 
significant main effect for gender and no significant main effect for gender role. All 
remaining interactions were also not significant. 
These findings do not support Gilligan’s contention since they suggest that the various 
contexts of the dilemmas influenced the degree of care responses rather than the dominating 
orientation. Furthermore, no clear gender differences were apparent (see again Figure 1).   
The data was further analysed in order to find the exact levels at which the interaction 
occurred. A series of four within participants Anovas were carried out distinguishing between 
the four gender role types, using a Bonferroni adjusted p-value of 0.0125. Results revealed no 
significant simple effects for masculine or for undifferentiated groups. However significant 
simple effects were found for feminine F (2, 26) = 12.52, p<0.001, and androgynous F (2, 24) 
= 19.85, p<0.001. 
Three between participants Anovas were carried out to distinguish between the three 
types of dilemma – impersonal, antisocial and prosocial. The p-value was adjusted to 0.0167 
in line with the appropriate Bonferroni adjustment. Results revealed no significant simple 
effects.     
Further t-tests were carried out following the simple effects, which were found at both 
the feminine and the androgynous conditions of gender role. Impersonal, antisocial, and 
prosocial were paired in 3 possible combinations. 3 paired-sample t-tests were conducted at 
the feminine gender role condition with an adjusted p-value of 0.0083 (Bonferroni). These 
tests revealed a significant difference between the prosocial and the antisocial dilemmas t (13) 
= 4.16, p<0.001, and between the prosocial and the impersonal dilemmas t (13) = 4.47, 
p<0.001. The pairing of the antisocial and the impersonal dilemmas did not reach 
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significance.  Three further t-tests revealed significant differences between the prosocial and 
the antisocial dilemmas at the androgynous level t (12) = 4.63, p<0.001, and between the 
prosocial and the impersonal dilemmas t (12) = 9.73, p<0.001. However no significant 
difference was found between the antisocial and the impersonal dilemmas. 
This outcome supports research on gender role differences and the assumption that 
gender role is a better predictor of moral orientation than gender. This study did not find 
orientation to differ between males and females. Similar to Ford and Lowery (1986), 
femininity level seems to affect the degree of care orientation one holds. This research also 
finds a relationship between moral orientation and an androgynous gender role. 
 
Consistency in moral orientation across dilemmas 
According to Gilligan (1986), a large proportion of one’s reasoning should reflect 
either care or justice orientation with relatively little consideration for the other across various 
contexts. The present study failed to support Gilligan’s postulation. Only 3 participants (2 
females and 1 male) consistently expressed the same orientation, and none of them scored 
exactly the same on all four dilemmas (they were consistent only on adjacent scores). 
Moreover, no sex differences in consistency of moral orientation were found. This outcome is 
in line with Wark and Krebs (1997) who reported consistency on adjacent scores by only two 
participants. 
 
Content Analysis of impersonal dilemmas 
All the impersonal dilemmas were classified into the categories: antisocial, 
philosophical, and prosocial based on the topics which were raised by the participants 
themselves. An initial analysis of the descriptive statistics revealed that 28 participants (17 
females & 11 males) reported prosocial dilemmas (48.3%), 52 participants (28 females & 24 
males) reported antisocial dilemmas (89.7%), and 36 participants (15 females & 21 males) 
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reported philosophical dilemmas (62.1%). Three univariate Anovas2 (combining both gender 
& gender role factors with each type of impersonal dilemma) were carried out to determine 
whether the content of the dilemmas influenced moral orientation scores. Although the three 
groups differ on the number of males/females, gender role, and number of dilemmas, each 
group had a representative number of each level of the factors, which enabled basic 
requirements for statistical analysis. The analyses revealed no significant effects at all levels. 
These results may have been different with a more strict statistical power control (e.g. an 
equal number of dilemmas in each group). Nonetheless, the lack of significant findings also 
suggest that moral orientation scores of the impersonal dilemmas represented a true variance 
of care responses versus justice responses rather than the tendency to report specific types of 
impersonal dilemmas.     
 
Moral Reasoning – consideration of consequences 
A next set of analyses turned to consider the proportion of judgements that were led by 
a consideration of consequences. Figure 2 shows the proportion of judgements led by 
consequences for both pro- and antisocial personal and impersonal dilemmas. 
 
--Insert Figure 2 about here-- 
 
Two paired-sample t-tests were carried out to detect whether the difference between the 
means is statistically significant. Results revealed a significant difference between the 
impersonal-antisocial dilemmas and the personal-antisocial dilemmas: t (51) = 5.51, p<0.001, 
but no significant difference between the impersonal-prosocial dilemmas and the personal-
prosocial dilemmas.  
                                                 
2 The p-value for the univariate Anovas was adjusted to 0.0167 in order to compare them to 
the initial 3-way Anova since participants were instructed to report only two impersonal 
dilemmas. 
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These results support current research by Krebs and his colleagues by providing an 
insight to an important aspect of moral decision-making. The results suggest that the effect of 
consequences on judgement when one is faced with when making a decision (a personal 
dilemma) is stronger than the effect of consequences one considers other people to have when 
they are faced with moral conflicts (an impersonal dilemma). However, this is true only with 
regard to antisocial conflicts – it does not hold for prosocial conflicts. 
One further analysis, examining the relationship between participants' consideration of 
consequences and moral orientation was not significant. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The present study explored two aspects in relation to moral decision-making. The first 
part (moral orientation) examined Gilligan’s theory of moral orientation and its relationship to 
dilemma type, gender and gender role. The second part (moral reasoning) explored a new 
aspect in recent research: consideration of consequences, focusing on whether consequences 
to the self differ from consequences to other people in the influence they have on decision-
making.   
  
Moral Orientation 
The results of this study are not consistent with Gilligan’s hypothesis about moral 
orientation. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) acknowledged that individuals can employ both 
justice and care orientations but they also claim that only one (either justice or care) prevails 
across an individual’s thinking. This study however, failed to find a prevailing orientation 
across all four dilemmas. Not only do participants include both care and justice judgements in 
their dilemmas, but the majority (all but three) were inconsistent with the orientation they 
presented to address each dilemma. This outcome supports Wark and Krebs’s (1997) study, in 
which they claim to have found poor consistency of moral orientation across four personal 
dilemmas. 
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Gilligan (1982) also proposed that the type of orientation is related to gender, assuming 
that males tend to focus on the justice orientation whereas females tend to focus on the care 
orientation. Like previous research (e.g. Walker et al.. 1987) this study fails to support this 
claim. On average, females focused on care-based judgements more than males did but this 
did not result in a statistically significant difference between the two gender groups. However, 
the overall mean (57%) for orientation suggests that all participants (regardless of gender) 
expressed slightly more care judgements than justice judgements. Furthermore, the 
consistency measure did not yield gender differences, which suggests that males were as 
inconsistent in their moral orientation as females were. In a similar vein gender did not 
produce a significant main effect or significant interactions, which leaves one to conclude that 
as far as this study was able to show moral orientation was not related to gender.  
This study, nevertheless, produced significant results regarding type of dilemma and 
gender role. A main effect for dilemma type qualified by an interaction between dilemma and 
gender role was found. A post-hoc analysis revealed the exact location of these significant 
differences: between the (a) prosocial and the antisocial dilemmas and (b) the prosocial and 
impersonal dilemmas at the femininity level and at the androgyny level. Similar to previous 
studies which included gender role as a factor (Sochting, Skoe, & Marcia, 1994) this study 
supports the claim that gender role may serve as a better predictor of moral orientation than 
gender alone. Moreover Ford and Lowery (1986) found the significant results to be at the 
femininity level, which has been replicated by this study.  
Unlike Ford and Lowery (1986), this finding was not related to gender and extends to 
generalise gender role as an important factor by finding significant comparisons at the 
androgyny level as well. Both androgyny and femininity gender roles were defined by a high 
score on the feminine scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1978). The fact that dilemma type reached 
significance at these levels only (only for the ‘androgynous’ and ‘feminine’ people) may 
provide the answer for the distinction between the significant results of those scales and the 
non-significant results of the masculine and the undifferentiated scales, which were both low 
at femininity. In other words, one may need to have high level of femininity in order to show 
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significant differences between some types of moral dilemma (e.g. prosocial-antisocial & 
prosocial-impersonal).  
The overall pattern of results regarding type of dilemma is similar to earlier findings by 
Wark and Krebs (1997). Wark and Krebs (1997) compared three types of dilemma (2 
Kohlbergian, 2 real life-prosocial, & 2 real life- antisocial). They reported that the 
Kohlbergian dilemmas pulled for justice orientation, the prosocial tended towards care 
orientation, and the antisocial towards justice orientation. In the present study, results were in 
a similar direction. 
There is, however, a marked difference between the means of the Kohlbergian 
dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1997) and the impersonal dilemmas (the present study). The notion 
that Kohlberg’s (philosophical) dilemmas evoke justice-based judgements is not new. Indeed, 
it was one of the main criticisms against Kohlberg’s model (Gilligan 1982). However, the use 
of impersonal dilemmas in the past has led to some interesting outcomes. Wark and Krebs 
(1996) reported that the philosophical impersonal dilemmas evoked a similar level of justice 
to that evoked by Kohlberg’s dilemmas, and that they evoked a significantly lower level of 
care than the antisocial impersonal dilemmas. These findings appear inconsistent with the 
outcomes of the present study but this inconsistency may reflect different tendencies in the 
scoring procedure. The means of the prosocial impersonal dilemmas and the antisocial 
impersonal dilemmas are fairly similar to the means of the personal prosocial and antisocial 
dilemmas, and share similar locations on the moral orientation scale (antisocial towards 
justice and prosocial towards care). The overall mean of the impersonal dilemmas seems to 
reflect the grouping of the various types of impersonal dilemmas (prosocial, antisocial, & 
philosophical). However, the statistical analyses  suggest that there was no particular 
influence from any type of dilemma on the overall mean of the impersonal dilemmas. There 
was no significant difference between the impersonal dilemmas on moral orientation scores. 
Methodologically, the need to control types of moral dilemma (for both personal & 
impersonal dilemmas) cannot be over emphasised. Wark and Krebs (1996) found that females 
tend to report more prosocial dilemmas whereas males tend to report more antisocial 
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dilemmas. These tendencies affect moral orientation scores – the present study demonstrated 
that prosocial dilemmas evoke more care judgements whereas antisocial dilemmas evoke 
more justice judgements. These gender-related patterns of reporting have not been 
demonstrated by this study, yet they may explain the outcome of Gilligan and Attanucci’s 
(1988) study in which type of dilemma was not held constant. Moreover, Wark and Krebs 
(2000) found that women report more prosocial real life dilemmas, perhaps because women 
consider prosocial dilemmas to be more significant as these dilemmas elicit most guilt (Wark, 
1998), whereas men experience more antisocial (transgression) types of conflict in real life. 
Thus, Gilligan’s notion of moral orientation may be embedded in life experience rather than 
to any particular gender group per se.  
 
Moral Reasoning – consideration of consequences 
The results concerning the second part of this study support to some extent some 
theoretical assumptions based on research by Krebs and his colleagues (in particular Krebs et 
al., 1997). The statistical analysis revealed a significant difference between consideration of 
consequences to the self and consideration of consequences to others but only as far as 
antisocial dilemmas were concerned. When type of dilemma was held constant for both the 
personal and the impersonal dilemmas, the prosocial dilemmas did not yield a significant 
difference. In fact both impersonal-prosocial and personal-prosocial dilemmas had identical 
means, which suggests that people tend to consider the outcome of their decisions and actions 
as important with regard to themselves and others equally when discussing moral dilemmas 
concerning prosocial issues. 
The difference in the results between the prosocial dilemmas and the antisocial 
dilemmas implies that people tend to regard consequences to themselves as highly important 
compared to consequences to others when discussing antisocial issues. By way of a contrast, 
consequences of prosocial dilemmas are regarded as important whether they relate to the self 
or to others. Perhaps this is not such a great surprise bearing in mind that antisocial issues are 
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closely related to law and punishment whereas prosocial issues are to a large extent related to 
one’s willingness to help another. 
Krebs et al. (1997) provide a constructive distinction between moral conflicts in terms 
of their anticipated consequences: (a) approach – approach conflicts (“should I spend more 
time with my boyfriend or my friends?”), (b) approach – avoidance conflicts (“should I lend 
money to my friend or avoid taking responsibility for him?”), and (c) avoidance – avoidance 
conflicts (“should I lie to my landlord or face eviction from my flat?”). The conflicts 
discussed in our antisocial dilemmas involved at least one avoidance aspect (e.g. underage 
drinking versus getting caught, facing condemnation versus feeling guilty, etc). It would be 
valid to assume that decisions, which involve consequences to the self that one is trying to 
avoid, will have more effect on one’s moral decision than decisions entailing consequences 
that others may try to avoid.  
This last point brings us back to potential dissonance between should and would that 
was described by Krebs et al. (1997). In the same way that this distinction explains the 
inconsistency between reasoning of hypothetical dilemmas and reasoning of real life 
dilemmas, it may explain the inconsistency between justification of others’ reasoning (when 
one is an observer) and the justification of one’s own reasoning. The outcomes of antisocial 
conflicts (e.g. law breaking, being unfair or unjust) often contrast one’s own morality 
standard. Denton and Krebs (1990) found that people tend to consider themselves to be more 
moral than other people, a phenomenon they named ‘the self-righteous bias’. This 
phenomenon ties in with the current findings. According to Krebs et al. (1997) people invest 
in their moral identities, which in return affect their moral decisions. In situations where 
people behave inconsistently with their moral identities (e.g. antisocial type situation) they are 
faced with negative outcome (physical or mental) and negative reputation, which motivate 
them to reduce the inconsistency between their belief about their own moral identity and how 
they have been perceived by society (judicial system, family relatives, friends, etc). This 
attempt to reduce negative reputation of one’s moral identity is manifested in moral dilemmas 
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in the form of justification of behaviour, which as research showed, involves low stage moral 
structures (Denton & Krebs 1990; Krebs et al, 1991; Wark & Krebs 1997; Krebs et al. 1997).  
This is a crucial observation for research on moral decision-making as it can only be 
explored by real life personal dilemmas where participants are asked to justify their own 
experiences. It follows then that in the present study participants may have felt the need to 
justify their own behaviour and reduce the inconsistency of their own moral identity, which 
led them to consider the consequences of their decisions/actions in a way that affected their 
decisions. In other words, participants regretted acting in a certain way and therefore justified 
their behaviour by considering the consequences of their actions in order to avoid similar 
outcomes in the future. However, when asked to discuss others’ moral decisions in antisocial 
situations the need to justify others’ behaviour in terms of its consequences was less 
important3.  On the contrary, prosocial behaviour educes a positive moral reputation that is 
more consistent with people’s moral identity (the ‘self righteous’ bias), and may validate or 
even improve one’s perception of oneself (Krebs et al. 1997).  
 
Conclusions 
These findings do not corroborate Gilligan’s theory of moral orientation. Participants 
rarely held one orientation across all dilemmas. Moreover gender was related to neither 
justice nor care orientations. Significant comparisons were found between the prosocial and 
the impersonal dilemmas and between the prosocial and the antisocial dilemmas for both 
feminine and androgynous gender role groups. This outcome suggests that although people, in 
general, do not hold a particular moral orientation, ‘feminine’ and ‘androgynous’ people score 
                                                 
3 Although it must be remembered that our definition of “personal” dilemmas were those 
which directly involved an individual and made that individual take some form of action. 
Thus it may be true that when an individual makes a decision not to act prosocially (although 
not necessarily antisocially) there may be some justification in terms of the potential 
consequences for the self. 
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significantly higher percentages of care-based responses when discussing prosocial dilemmas 
compared with impersonal or antisocial dilemmas. The latter focuses the attention on the 
effect of external sources (e.g. type of dilemma) on moral decision-making. The 
acknowledgement of such interaction between external and internal (e.g. gender role) sources 
of variation on moral decision-making is crucial to the understanding of how people judge 
real life moral conflicts.  
Results also indicate, as might have been anticipated, that people consider the 
consequences of their decisions when they discuss moral conflicts. Furthermore, the 
consequences of moral decisions seem to have more influence when people discuss personal-
antisocial conflicts rather than impersonal-antisocial conflicts. This difference was not evident 
between the prosocial-personal/impersonal dilemmas. It may be that when people discuss 
personal-antisocial (e.g. violations of rules, laws, or fairness) dilemmas they seek to resist 
adopting a negative reputation. The therefore justify their own behaviour with a higher 
percentage of consideration of consequences in their attempt to view themselves more 
positively (and enhance their moral identity). This pressure disappears when people discuss 
impersonal-antisocial dilemmas because the need to justify other people’s behaviour in a 
positive way is less strong and has less influence on judgements and reasoning. More so, it is 
not apparent in prosocial dilemmas because this type of behaviour has a positive reputation 
and entails a positive moral identity. Consequently, the outcomes of people’s prosocial 
behaviour have less influence on their reasoning.  
It is also possible to see some ways in which the current findings might inform work in 
moral education.  For instance, we see in the results of the current study a link between 
internal (gender role) and external (dilemma type) factors in making moral judgements. There 
is also now strong evidence to suggest that the underlying motivations for moral judgements 
differ according to the type of dilemma under consideration. In view of this, educators need to 
consider whether it might be appropriate to employ different strategies for encouraging 
mature moral reasoning with respect to pro- and antisocial behaviour. Moreover, the influence 
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of internal factors such as gender role points to a need to gear any educational interventions to 
the needs of specific individuals. 
As the current study has demonstrated, another important factor in making moral 
decisions is a consideration of the consequences of actions. Such consideration appears at its 
most influential when reasoning about one’s own response to antisocial dilemmas (having 
done or doing something wrong). As has already been indicated, the motivation to maintain a 
reputation or positive moral identity not least, one might imagine, amongst one’s peers, could 
explain findings here. However, it was not the case that participants in this study were 
motivated to gain a positive (prosocial) self-identity but rather that they were motivated to 
defend themselves against acquiring a negative (antisocial) one. This is an issue that is less to 
do with moral education and more to do with the values we encourage as a society; behaving 
“morally” is less about prosocial behaviour and more about not committing antisocial 
behaviour.  But a greater emphasis, in the schoolroom and beyond, on the social merits of 
prosocial behaviour might just encourage more of it. 
Finally, when considering antisocial dilemmas from an “abstract”, impersonal 
perspective people imagine the consequences of an action as less important than when they 
consider a similar event from a first personal perspective.  There is, it would seem, a 
separation of the actual from the theoretical here (at least in the reports of our participants). 
Further studies from an educational perspective could help to identify whether encouraging a 
child or adult to reflect on their own experiences and past, real-life moral decisions might 
trigger forms of reasoning that are better suited to helping individuals make more mature 
decisions in future, real-life moral dilemmas.  
Altogether this study overcomes methodological problems in earlier studies and 
confirms previous findings in terms of the effect of dilemma type and gender role on moral 
orientation. It also points to the importance of individuals’ consideration of consequences of 
their actions in judging real life moral dilemmas.  Further investigations are needed to clarify 
the role of this new aspect of moral reasoning that appears to be important in moral decision-
making.  Such investigations could help in the development of interactional models of moral 
Moral decision-making in real life  /  24 
 
reasoning that account for the interplay between internal (e.g. gender role) and external (e.g. 
dilemma type) influences on everyday moral reasoning. 
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 Appendix 1: The Probe Questions Form 
 
1) What did you see to be the issues involved at the time? 
2) What made it a moral conflict? 
3) What options did you or the person/people involved in the dilemma consider? Why? 
4) Do you think you (or the person/people involved) did the right thing? 
5) Why / Why not? 
6) How about the other people or person involved? 
7) What was each person’s responsibility? Why? 
8) In general, should people help one another? why? (please relate your answer to each 
dilemma) 
9) Should people always follow their moral principles? (please relate to each dilemma) 
10) Are there any circumstances where it is right not to do the ‘right’ thing? (how is that 
relate to each dilemma)   
11) Following your (personal) or other’s (impersonal) experience, did you change your point 
of view on the matter? 
12) In what way and why? 
13) In cases where some sort of relationship is described in your dilemma: What is the most 
important thing that each party should be concerned with and why? 
 
For impersonal dilemmas only: 
14) How would you have acted if you found yourself personally involved in this situation 
and why? Please describe all the perspectives that you think are involved. 
15) Using the scale from the first questionnaire, please rate the importance of the conflict in 
your life at that time:  
  Not at all important A….B….C….D….E     Very important 
 
For personal dilemmas only: 
14) Under what circumstances would you have acted differently and why? 
15) If in the future you will come across a similar situation, how do you think you will act 
and why? 
16)  What would you have done / How would you have acted if you were the other person or 
people involved and why? 
17) Do you think your judgement of the situation would have been different if you were not 
personally involved? 
18) In what way and why? 
Using the scale from the first questionnaire, please rate: 
19) The degree of difficulty you have experienced in making the decision about what to do: 
   Not at all difficult     A….B….C….D….E    Very difficult 
20) How constrained you felt when you made your decision (and acted accordingly): 
   Not at all constrained A….B….C….D….E   Very constrained  
    
  
 
Table 1.   Mean proportions of judgements that were predominantly care-based  
 
  Gender role  
Dilemma 
type 
 Masculine Feminine Andro-
gynous 
Undiff-
erentiated 
Total 
Impersonal Gender      
 Male .56  
 
.35 
 
.32 
 
.67 
 
.50 
 Female .62 
 
.55 
 
.45 
 
.61 
 
.55 
Antisocial       
 Male .44 
 
.45 
 
.50 
 
.35 
 
.44 
 Female .40 
 
.58 
 
.41 
 
.44 
 
.47 
Prosocial       
 Male .60 
 
.80 
 
.80 
 
.75 
 
.70 
 Female .80 
 
.83 
 
.84 
 
.66 
 
.78 
 
 
 
      
  
 
Figure 1. Total means for moral orientation score of all levels of all factors (expressed as 
percentages) 
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Figure 2. Means proportion of judgements that were led by consideration of consequences for 
impersonal and personal, antisocial and prosocial dilemmas 
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